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Abstract 
 
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras constitute the most violent region on 
the globe outside a declared warzone: The Northern Triangle. Cities in these 
countries have dominated the list of most dangerous cities in the world for 
years. For instance, Honduras’ San Pedro Sula had been at the top of the list 
for four consecutive years - only overtaken by Caracas, Venezuela in the latest 
report (Seguridad Justicia y Paz, 2016). El Salvador has, at the time of writing, 
an average of twenty-four homicides per day (Marroquin, 2016), and 
Guatemala is the fifth country with the highest homicide rate in Latin America 
(Gagne, 2016). Most of the violence in these countries is generally attributed 
to the Maras, urban gangs that formed in marginalized neighborhoods in Los 
Angeles, California by Central American migrants and refugees, and then 
strengthened in the Northern Triangle following mass deportations from the 
United States, including the expatriation of criminals (Cruz, 2010).   
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The Maras have been described as the main public security threat of the 
region, and are also one of the main concerns to the Western Hemisphere as 
a whole (Aguilar and Carranza, 2008). The governments of the countries in 
the Northern Triangle have attempted to counter the gang problem in mostly 
offensive strategies, such as the Mano Dura (“Iron Fist”) in El Salvador and 
Guatemala, and Cero Tolerancia (“Zero Tolerance”) in Honduras. These 
have included mass incarcerations and an increasing militarization of the 
police (Jütersonke et. al., 2009), yet have not reduced the violence in the 
Northern Triangle and have not achieved the disappearance of gangs (Mojica 
Lechuga, 2014; Ribando Seelke, 2014).  
 
The general diagnosis for the problem of the persistence of violent 
non-state actors in today’s world system is that they exist in states that have 
empirically failed, because in functioning ones, the state is supposed to be the 
only actor with the legitimacy to use violence so as to provide security for its 
citizens (Jackson and Roseberg, 1982; Davis, 2009; Dannreuther, 2013). 
However, evidence from countries both in the ‘Global North’ and in the 
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‘Global South’ shows that there has been a global rise in private actors using 
force (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011). This suggests that the diagnosis is 
problematic, as violent non-state actors do not only operate in failed states, 
but also have presence in countries that have relative political stability, clear 
economic progress and a democratic character, as could be argued is the case 
of the Northern Triangle (Davis, 2009). If these states have not failed, and are 
therefore theoretically providing security for their citizens, then why are the 
Maras still persisting? 
 
This essay argues that one of the reasons violent non-state actors are 
able to persist in the context of modern states is because they can be 
perceived, paradoxically, as sources of private security. It is acknowledged, 
however, that the reason being proposed in the paper is not the only cause that 
armed private actors continue to operate in the modern international system, 
as each individual case is subject to specific political, social, cultural, or 
economic factors. Nevertheless, this essay does not seek to give a definite 
generic answer, but to merely propose a further aspect that should be taken 
into consideration when studying and dealing with violent non-state actors. 
 
Taking this into account, the essay will proceed as follows: first, the 
concept of the modern state is going to be explained and it will be argued why 
it is ‘unusual’ that violent non-state actors continue to persist. This will be 
followed by questioning the assumed relationship between state failure and 
the proliferation of armed private actors, and it will be argued that this 
diagnosis is rather misleading. The second section will address the question 
of why, despite that the Northern Triangle countries are not failed states, the 
Maras continue to operate, threatening the citizens’ security that the state is 
supposed to provide. This will be done by engaging with the concept of 
security, and by illustrating why it has generally been conceived as a public 
good, and why the paper argues that, in this case, it should rather be 
understood as a private one. The third section will argue that this condition of 
security leaves space for non-state actors to be perceived as providers of it. 
Finally, the essay will conclude with the implications of this analysis for 
policy and for the general study of private security in international politics.  
 
The Modern State vs. Violent Non-State Actors 
 
When analyzing the use of force in the context of modern politics, Max 
Weber’s understanding of the state is generally the starting point (Avant, 
2005). Weber (1946) defines the state as an entity that successfully claims a 
monopoly over the legitimate means of violence in a given territory. Under 
this understanding, it is generally assumed that the power to provide security 
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resides within the state, who is therefore the only legitimate provider of it to 
a given population (Avant, 2005). Thus, non-state actors’ use of violence is 
commonly conceived as a threat to the current system of sovereign states 
(Krause and Milliken, 2009). 
 
Nevertheless, this understanding of the state is neither natural nor 
timeless. The state’s monopoly over the means of violence is a relatively 
modern concept that only started to consolidate in the beginning of the 19th 
century in Europe (Kaldor, 2012). Most of the analyses and explanations of 
state formation and monopolization of violence are thus Eurocentric and do 
not necessarily apply to the consolidation of states in other places of the 
world, for instance, in the Northern Triangle. However, these studies of the 
European experience can still offer an insight of the general political thought 
in the literature on the use of violence in modern states. 
 
One of the main writers on state formation is Charles Tilly (1985), 
who argues that states were created unintentionally through a process of war, 
extraction, and protection. In his understanding, rulers in Europe waged war 
in order to defeat their external enemies and gain territorial control. To 
finance these wars, they created modes of extraction, or taxation that 
eventually became institutionalized and began to form relations of power 
among a population. Moreover, rulers needed to disarm their domestic rivals 
so as to forbid them to use violence to defend their properties and affect the 
extraction model. In exchange, however, the state would provide protection 
from external enemies. Therefore, this process located the legitimate coercive 
power in the hands of the state. Tilly compares this state-making development 
to organized crime, and emphasizes that it was an unintentional process that 
resulted from rulers advancing their self-interests (Tilly, 1985). 
 
Nevertheless, before the apparent disarmament of violent non-state 
actors, these used to have some utility for monarchs and rulers. Force used by 
different groups was a product in the market, as these groups could be hired 
as mercenaries to fight wars on behalf of kingdoms, or other entities 
(Thomson, 1996; Davey, 2010). However, because of the lack of allegiance 
and loyalty to specific entities, these groups became less useful to rulers and 
ultimately were perceived as threats. Eventually, this perception and the need 
of domestic pacification led to the formation of standing armies that were 
loyal to one single state (Kaldor, 2012). According to Thomson (1996), the 
abolition of non-state violence was, thus, also a result of the interests of rulers, 
and not of the society itself. After the consolidation of states, violence and the 
provision of security were thought to have shifted from being provided by the 
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market, to being provided authoritatively by state institutions (Thomson, 
1996).  
 
In short, according to Kaldor (2012: 22), there were a series of new 
distinctions that characterized the newly formed European states, which had 
significant implications for the relation between the state and non-state actors: 
 
 ‘The distinction between public and private, between the sphere of 
state and non-state activity […], the separation of private economic 
activity from public state activities, and the removal from physical 
coercion from economic activities, […] the distinction between the 
legitimate bearer of arms and the non-combatant or the criminal.’  
 
This process, however, did not occur exactly in the same way in the rest of 
the world, as Tilly acknowledges, because state formation in the post-colonial 
world did not emerge organically, but was rather imposed by the colonial 
metropoles (Dannreuther, 2013). Similarly, in the case of Central America, 
state formation derived as a result of a high degree of foreign intervention 
from multilateral organizations and from the United States (Montobbio, 
2006). A further significant difference is that the use of war to create states 
the way European rulers did is no longer accepted due to the establishment of 
the current international system and international law (Barkawi and Laffey, 
2006). Therefore, predictions about the process of state making in the so-
called ‘Global South’ cannot be made on the basis of the European experience 
(Tilly, 1985). 
 
Nonetheless, there are some similarities in the processes and one of 
them is the advancement of local elite’s interests. In Montobbio’s (2006) 
view, the struggles for independence in Central America were fundamentally 
a result of elite’s interests to defeat external forces and consolidate their own 
power, rather than these struggles being a collective national project. Apart 
from the wars for independence from the Spanish Empire, Central American 
states would later undergo their own civil conflicts during the context of the 
Cold War, which had the main objective to counter communist guerrillas and 
sympathizers. 
 
Guatemala was the country with the lengthiest civil war, and only 
became a modern democracy again until 1986, following authoritarian 
military regimes that were supported by the United States (Richani, 2010). 
The civil conflict was mainly directed to rural areas –which have been 
systematically marginalized since the colonial period– where most of the land 
reform movements originated (Booth and Walker, 1993). The armed forces 
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in Guatemala committed numerous human right abuses, especially against the 
different indigenous groups, and the Guatemalan government used ‘death 
squads’ to carry out targeted killings and torture suspected insurgents 
(Richani, 2010). Bunk and Fowler (2012) describe the state of Guatemala as 
‘the continuation of war by other means’ and argue that since its consolidation 
as a state, it has been characterized by exceptional violent political life.  
 
El Salvador’s civil war also developed in a context of repressive 
military regimes supported by the United States against national liberation 
fronts with a left-wing agenda. Like in the case of Guatemala, the Salvadoran 
armed forces also became known worldwide for abuses to human rights in the 
name of counterinsurgency, and clandestine para-military groups acting as 
mercenaries were also used a tool for the government to eliminate their 
suspected enemies (Pedraza Fariña, et. al., 2007).  
 
After the wars, the guerrilla groups in Guatemala and El Salvador 
were demobilized and integrated into their respective political system 
(Richani, 2010). In Tilly’s understanding, this could be viewed as a way of 
monopolizing violence by the state through the pacification of internal rivals, 
and in theory, offering them protection in exchange. The end of the civil wars, 
however, did not result in the eradication of non-state use of violence. Some 
groups that were created during the conflict continue to operate today. One 
example is the Clandestine Security Apparatuses (CIACS) in Guatemala, 
which are one of the para-military groups that used to serve the military 
government as mercenaries to repress the guerrilla movements. Today, these 
groups no longer officially serve the government – although illicit 
arrangements with some state officials do exist – but rather assist criminal 
organizations and carry out illegal activities, such as drug- and arms 
trafficking (Pérez-Brignoli, 1989; InSight Crime, 2016a). 
  
State formation in Honduras was arguably slightly different than in its 
neighboring countries. The consolidation of the Honduran state was also a 
result of the interests of local elites and of foreign powers, especially the 
United States, but Honduras did not experience an official civil war (Booth 
and Walker, 1993). Nevertheless, it did face twenty years of military rule that 
repressed left wing sympathizers, and other marginalized groups. The country 
also served as a military base for the United States and the Nicaraguan 
“Contras” during the civil conflict in Nicaragua against the established 
Sandinista government (Bunk and Fowler, 2012).  The legacy of militarism 
continues today, especially considering the provision of security. Honduras is 
the only country in the Northern Triangle that has a Military Police, which 
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together with the state’s armed forces have a more significant role in policing 
activities than the National Police (InSight Crime, 2016b). 
 
Since the end of the conflicts, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras 
saw an apparent proliferation of other non-state armed actors like 
transnational drug trafficking organizations, and the Maras, which joined 
existing street gangs after mass deportations of criminalized Central 
American migrants from the United States (Richani, 2010).  The wide 
availability of weapons after the conflicts and the social and economic 
consequences of them contributed to the strengthening of these groups 
(Pedraza Fariña, et. al., 2007) Moreover, private security companies also 
propagated as a result of the security concerns of citizens due to the increasing 
levels of violence. Currently the number private security personnel in the 
three countries outnumber the public police forces (Ramsey, 2012). 
Therefore, this suggests that although relatively stable state institutions have 
been formed in the Northern Triangle, it does not mean that the provision of 
security is out of the market and purely under the authority of states. However, 
this is not exclusive to Central America. According to Avant (2005), a 
transnational market for force – both legal and illegal – now exists alongside 
the system of states, and many actors including state forces, multinational 
corporations, international organizations, and individuals are demanding non-
state forces for the provision of security.  This is the case even in European 
states, despite their ‘organic’ consolidation of the monopoly over the means 
of violence. For example, according to Abrahamsen and Williams (2011), 
private security personnel in the United Kingdom also outnumber the public 
police, and geographically, Europe alongside North America account for the 
largest percentage of the global security market. 
 
In short, in theory, modern states are understood to have had 
monopolized the legitimate means of violence by being able to eliminate 
domestic rivals, and provide security to their citizens in exchange. However, 
as evidence suggests, this has not necessarily been the case around the world, 
and for instance, in Central America, an illegal market for force continues to 
exist. The next section will discuss whether this is due to the failure of states.  
 
Have States Failed? 
 
One of the main views in the literature for the persistence of insecurity caused 
by non-state groups in the ‘Global South’ argues that the nature of the state 
formation process itself in some countries is the root cause, because their 
statehood has not been able to fully become ‘strong’ and ‘developed’ so as to 
eliminate the threats from domestic actors (Dannreuther, 2013). By placing 
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their analysis in Sub-Saharan Africa, Jackson and Rosberg (1982) argue, for 
example, that empirical state weakness persists in this region because of the 
imposition of juridical sovereignty by international law, which has not 
allowed for there to be any major changes in the inherited colonial jurisdiction 
of these states, or for any new process of state formation. 
 
There are many definitions and understandings of failed states, but the 
general idea these have in common is that failed states are characterized by a 
‘collapse of the central government to impose order, and [by] the loss of 
physical control over territory and the monopoly over the legitimate use of 
force’ (Taylor, 2013; 1). Vinci (2008) goes as far as to argue that failed states 
are distinguished by the presence of domestic anarchy within their territory, 
due to the lack of a central policing authority. This results, in his view, in the 
persistence of autonomous armed groups, as the state is unable to exert 
authority over them due to its weak institutions. Therefore, the general notion 
is that as states weaken, violent non-state actors become more powerful 
(Krause and Milliken, 2009).  
 
Dannreuther (2013) expands the analysis by further dividing the 
characteristics of states into four hierarchical categories: developed, 
globalizing, praetorian, and failed. In his view, violent non-state actors would 
predominantly exist in failed and praetorian states. 
 
There are examples of armed groups having a significant presence and 
power in states that are considered failed or weak, such as is the case of 
Somalia, which according to some authors like Sean McFate (2014; 131) has 
dissolved into anarchy due to decades of conflict, allowing ‘warlords, 
militants, factional armies, and rogue militants’ to proliferate. Arguably, 
because of the lack of a central authority in the country, it would make sense 
to attribute the persistence of violent non-state actors to the weakness of 
statehood. Private actors using force, however, also exist in countries that are 
not considered failed states, as is the case of Brazil. Drug trafficking 
organizations and urban gangs have a significant presence in the main cities 
of the country and pose a direct threat to the authority of the state (Arias and 
Rodrigues, 2006), yet Brazil is defined as a ‘globalizing’ state by 
Dannreuther’s (2013) criteria. Furthermore, apart from legal non-state actors 
using force, criminal groups, such as gangs, also pose a threat to security in 
‘developed’ states, – although arguably to a lesser extent – such as is the case 
of the Yakuza in Japan (Siniawer, 2012), and street gangs in major British 
cities like Glasgow (Fraser, 2013). The problem of gangs, according to 
(Hagerdon, 2008), is a worldwide phenomenon. State failure does not, 
however, describe the situation in Japan, or the United Kingdom because, 
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despite the presence of these actors, there is still a central authority that 
imposes order.  
 
The conditions for state failure do not quite fit the Northern Triangle 
countries either.  Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador do not experience, 
for instance, domestic anarchy. The governments in the three countries are 
democratically elected, which in theory, make them the legitimate authority 
(Davis, 2009). In terms of the economic growth, – which is an additional 
criteria for functioning states, according to Dannreuther’s classification – 
according reports from the World Bank (2016), Guatemala has been one of 
the strongest economic performers in Latin America in recent years with an 
annual GDP growth of 3 per cent, Honduras’s economy is recovering from 
the 2008 crisis, and El Salvador has been able to reduce poverty by 7 percent 
in the last ten years. Although these countries have also some of the highest 
inequality rates in Latin America, their stable – although slow – growth 
suggests that it is flawed to solely define them as failed states. The Northern 
Triangle states have further, not completely lost the authority over the gangs, 
as they do have the capacity to carry out successful operations against them. 
Therefore, the argument of violent non-state actors persisting in states 
because of the latter’s failure seems not to be accurate to every situation. 
According to Krause and Milliken (2009), rather than explaining violent non-
state actors through naturalizing categories of state, it is more useful to 
analyze how state institutions actually work to provide security and public 
order. Thus, this essay suggests that the question of the paper should rather 
be approached by analyzing the concept of security. 
 
A further interpretation in a similar framework, argues that violent 
non-state actors are in their own process of forming a state, and the current 
states in which they live in are fragmenting because of their ‘un-natural’ 
nature (Taylor and Botea, 2008). Mary Kaldor (2012) argues that the new 
wars in the post-Cold War period will not be about acquiring territory to form 
states, as was the case in Western Europe, but rather about state fragmentation 
on the basis of identity. Kaldor’s (2012) analysis is based on her experience 
during the ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia, therefore her conclusions 
could make sense when analyzing that specific case, but it is not necessary 
applicable to everywhere in the world. Many non-state actors are neither 
motivated by anti-government ideas or regime change (Davis, 2009), some of 
these groups are actually entangled with state power and state agents (Krause 
and Milliken, 2009), like is the case, for example, of cases of illicit 
arrangements between organized crime groups and political elites in Latin 
America (Dudley, 2016). It would also not make sense to describe private 
security enterprises as being in a state formation process, despite them being 
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considered non-state actors using force, because they operate alongside states, 
and to some extent depend on them (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011). 
 
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are not fragmenting, and the 
gangs are not in the process of becoming a state either (Krause or Milliken, 
2009). In an interview, the Salvadoran leader of Barrio 18, one of the main 
Mara groups, is asked about the political objectives of the gangs, to which he 
answers they have none. According to him, the gangs see themselves a social 
group that is still a part of the respective societies of each country, suggesting 
that they do not aim to create a separate state (Lechuga Mojica, 2013). 
Furthermore, the two main groups of Maras – Barrio 18 and MS-13, who are 
rivals – are not organized in a way in which they could be able to form a state, 
as there is not a centralized leadership. Although the structure of the gangs is 
officially hierarchical, each cell or clique across the continent has an extent 
of autonomy and does not necessarily follow orders from a main command 
(Jütersonke, et. al., 2009; Dudley and Pachico, 2015). Moreover, gangs 
depend on the corrupt nature of the state to further their activities, which is 
one of the reasons for them not trying to overthrow it (Bunker and Sullivan, 
2014). Therefore, arguing that violent non-state actors are able to persist 
because they are in the process of their own state formation does not seem 
accurate for the case of every armed non-state actor, as is the case of the 
Maras. 
 
In short, the argument that violent non-state actors are only able to 
persist in failed, weak, or collapsing states seems to be misleading, as armed 
private actors are active on a global scale, and to some extent still act on a 
parallel level to functioning states. That said, even though the countries in the 
Northern Triangle are not failed states, their attempts to counter the security 
threat of gangs has not achieved to stop them from using force and from 
continuing to generate violence. Why are the efforts of these countries failing 
to provide security to their citizens? The following sections will approach this 
problematic by taking a step back and critically analysing the concept of 
security and the role it plays in the persistence of violent non-state actors in 
modern states.  
 
What is Security? 
 
Traditionally, the notion of security used to be considered in military terms 
and was concerned mostly with national security and the status quo of the 
international system. Being secure meant, for modern states, to be in a 
position where they would be free of intervention by other states, or where 
they would be able to defend themselves in case of armed conflict (Baldwin, 
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1995). This view, however, has changed alongside with the end of the Cold 
War and the development of critical theories in the social sciences 
(Dannreuther, 2013). The current understanding of security has been 
‘expanded’ in at least two ways. One is a vertical expansion, as Rotschild 
(1995) argues, as the objects to be secured are no longer limited to states, but 
also include individuals. This results in the inclusion of ‘human-centric’ 
approaches, which among other aspects, question the assumption that states 
are inherently sources of security. The other expansion occurred horizontally, 
as it added further answers to the question of what can be considered as a 
threat to security, considering that the individual became the center of gravity. 
Therefore, issues such as poverty, diseases, and natural disasters came to be 
conceived under the umbrella term of security. 
 
Thus, the meaning of security and what constitutes insecurity is 
ambiguous. Krahmann (2008) for example, argues that security can be 
defined in the relation to threats: security can mean the prevention of threats 
when there is an absence of them; it can be the deterrence of threats, when 
these have not yet become a reality, and it can also be the protection from 
threats, once these are an actuality and the only option left is survival. For 
Luckham and Kirk (2013) the understanding of security depends on the 
supply and the demand side. For providers of security, it means the creation 
and maintenance of an authoritative social order. For the receivers of it, 
security is a basic entitlement to protection by these social orders. 
Furthermore, the approach of human security understands the concept as 
emancipation. Being secure means being free from want and free from fear 
(Kerr, 2010). 
 
Nevertheless, any conception of security will also depend on the 
following questions: who or what is the object to be secured, for which values, 
from what threats, by what means, at what costs, and in what time period 
(Baldwin, 1997). Therefore, because the meaning of security depends on a 
number of factors, it could be argued that what might be considered as a 
source of security for some actors does not necessarily mean it is also for 
others, suggesting that both the meaning of security and the decision of what 
constitutes a source of insecurity are, to some extent, social constructions 
rather than natural (Dannreuther, 2013). 
 
Bringing these definitions back to the case of the Maras in Central 
America, the provision of security can be better understood in Krahmann’s 
understanding as protection, since gang-violence is already an existing threat, 
and most of the policies, like Mano Dura, have been a reaction to the problem, 
rather than a prevention of it (Hume, 2007b). This definition of security as 
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protection is also in accordance to the other meanings given to security by the 
authors mentioned above, since protecting individuals from the threat of 
violence is also a way to address human insecurity, as this threat undermines 
the freedom from fear and freedom from want of the citizens of the Northern 
Triangle (U.S. Department of State, 2016). Moreover, it is also a way for the 
providers of security to create and maintain a social order, and for the 
receivers to feel protected by it, in Luckham and Kirk’s understanding. Thus, 
for the analysis of this essay and by taking into consideration the different 
factors that contribute to a definition of security, it will be understood as the 
protection of individuals from the threat of violence for the value of 
emancipation, and at the cost of a legitimate use of force.  Taking this into 
account, can security ever be a public good? The answer to this question is 
necessary to understand why the Maras persist in the Northern Triangle 
despite the efforts of states to protect their citizens from them. 
 
Is Security a Public or a Private Good? 
 
In the traditional understanding of security and in the context of state 
formation, it has generally been assumed that states provide public security 
to their citizens since they are the only legitimate users of force. However, as 
argued before in the paper, there appears to be a global rise in the private 
security industry, which seems to suggest that security has been commodified 
(Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011). However, according to Krahmann (2008), 
whether security is a public or a private good does not necessarily depend on 
the provider, but rather on the nature of security itself. By applying public 
goods theory, Krahmann defines a collective good as one that is neither 
excludable, nor rival. Consequently, a private is good is one that has the 
ability to exclude potential users from its benefits, and its consumption can 
reduce its availability to others (Krahmann, 2008: 384).  
 
For Krahmann, whether security is a collective good or a commodity 
depends how it is defined. If security is understood as prevention, then it 
seems to be more accurately conceived as a public good, since preventing a 
threat, such as an infectious disease, will benefit everyone who could 
potentially be affected and its ‘consumption’ will not diminish the availability 
of the good. In this case, therefore, it does not matter whether it is the state 
that is preventing the threat or if it is a private actor, as security will still be 
non-excludable and non-rival. When security is defined as deterrence, 
Krahmann argues it can be better understood as a club good, which means 
that it is excludable but non-rival. An example for security as a club good is 
the creation of international security alliances, such as NATO, whose security 
is exclusive to their members, but the joining of further adherents to it will 
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not diminish the availability of the good (Krahmann, 2008: 387). And lastly, 
security is a private good when it is defined as protection. For example, 
according to Pillay (2006), the increase of gated communities in South Africa 
as a form of protection from the threat of criminal activities, excludes those 
who are not able to live within them, and also diminishes their security as 
crime activities concentrate in the areas outside the gated communities. 
 
For the analysis of the essay, the security threat that is at stake in the 
Northern Triangle is gang-related violence, and therefore security was 
defined as protection in Krahmann’s understanding. Thus, following 
Krahamann’s framework, security would therefore be conceived as a private 
good, even if it is provided by the state, as the efforts to protect the population 
have been excludable and rival. To understand why this is the case, it is 
necessary to refer back to the political history of the region (Hume, 2007b). 
The states’ policies to counter the Maras so as to guarantee security have been 
excludable, because not all the citizens in the countries of the Northern 
Triangle can equally benefit from them. The legacy of repression and 
exclusion of certain areas and neighborhoods during the civil conflicts has not 
been displaced (Aguilar and Carranza, 2008), and the perception that 
protecting of the hegemony of the elites is the priority of the state continues 
to persist (Hume, 2007b; Bunker and Fowler, 2012).  
 
According to Hume (2007b) and Aguilar and Carranza (2008), the 
narrative of the ‘war on gangs’ has constructed a view where the Maras are 
seen politically as an ‘Other’, which justifies the use of ‘extraordinary’ 
measures by the authorities of the countries in the Northern Triangle. Thus, 
because of the wide control that the gangs have over neighbourhoods, certain 
areas are stigmatized and become targets for constant state interventions. This 
has led to the exclusion of certain groups from the protection of the state, as 
anyone associated to the Maras in any way is a potential target for the 
application of force. When Mano Dura was first applied, it was specifically 
directed at people who ‘looked’ like gangsters, which resulted in the targeting 
of any young, poor, tattooed, or deported man, despite the fact that most of 
them were victims of gang violence, instead of members of one (Pedraza 
Fariña et. al., 2007; Dudley, 2010). Moreover, this exclusion of protection is 
also accompanied with high levels of impunity. The countries in the Northern 
Triangle have some of the highest impunity rates in Latin America (Human 
Rights Watch, 2016), and crimes committed in marginalized neighbourhoods 
are less likely to be processed, due to the relative absence of the state. This 
has led to individuals taking security in their own hands, like in the case of 
Guatemala, where lynching of criminals became a common way of dealing 
with justice, due to the absence of the state’s protection (Gurney, 2014). 
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Therefore, the way the Northern Triangle states have attempted to provide 
protection from the Maras has excluded some sectors of society, which means 
that the possibility of this type of security being a public good is dismissed.  
 
These security policies in the Northern Triangle can also be 
understood as rival, because by carrying out the operations against the gangs 
in the name of protection, the security for some individuals and groups is 
diminished. As mentioned above, the Mano Dura strategies were initially 
directed at whoever appeared to be a suspected gang member, which resulted 
in mass incarcerations of innocent people, and also in extra-judicial killings 
by the police, especially in El Salvador (Hume, 2007b). This common use of 
public violence by the authorities to counter the gangs has led to the further 
stigmatization of communities that were already systematically marginalized 
(Holden, 2004; Dudley, 2010). Moreover, despite the Maras being described 
as an ‘Other’ by the narrative of the government, they are not ‘separate’ from 
the rest of the population, in the sense that many of them live in the same 
neighbourhoods and even the same houses as their family members and 
friends who are not necessarily gang members (Hume, 2007a). According to 
field research carried out by Hume (2007a) in a neighborhood controlled by 
the MS-13 in San Salvador, non-gang members living in these communities 
tended to view actions of the state against the gang as a form of protection. 
However, when these operations targeted their sons, brothers, or fathers who 
are part of the gang, the state’s actions were rather viewed as a threat.   
 
A further way in which the security efforts can be seen as rival, is 
because gangs can easily move from one neighborhood to another, even if 
these are in different countries. According to field research by journalist Ioan 
Grillo (2016), when the state’s interventions were being too severe on gangs 
in one area, they would normally transfer to another barrio. Which, suggests 
that the concentration of security forces for the protection of some, diminishes 
the security of others. Therefore, efforts of the state to protect the population 
from the gangs is not only excludable, but also rival, since it can potentially 
undermine the security of the people already directly threatened by the 
presence of the Maras. 
 
Hence, whether security is a private or a public good depends on the 
nature of security and not on the provider. In the case of the Northern 
Triangle, security, even when provided by the state, seems to qualify more as 
a private good. If certain groups are being excluded from the provision of 
security by the state, or their security is being undermined, then how does this 
have implications for the persistence of the Maras? The next section will 
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address this question by arguing that, paradoxically, the Maras can be 
perceived as sources of security. 
 
(In)Security and the persistence of the Maras in the Northern Triangle 
 
It is easy to agree that the Maras are generally a source of insecurity in the 
Northern Triangle. They formed as social networks that exploited grievances 
of the marginalized migrant population in Los Angeles and in Central 
America, and continue to use this grievance to justify for the illegal activities 
to capture profit (Bunker and Sullivan, 2014). The two main gangs operating 
in the urban centers of the Northern Triangle, the MS-13 and Barrio 18, are 
constantly at war with each other, fighting for the control of territory and 
extortion networks. The Maras extort the transport sector, businesses, and in 
the case of Barrio 18, even the households in their controlled neighbourhoods, 
who are charged the so-called ‘war tax’ (Cruz, 2010). Failing to pay the 
extortions, normally leads to assassination. The threat of harassment and rape 
also undermines the security of those living in areas where the Maras operate 
(Hume, 2007a).  Nevertheless, as argued in the previous section of the paper, 
the state has not been able to provide public protection from the Maras, and 
has even diminished the security of some, with for example, extra-judicial 
massacres by the police that many times include innocent individuals 
(Pedraza Fariña, et. al., 2007). If the residents in these neighbourhoods are 
repressed both by the state and by the gangs, then how can they deal with the 
ongoing violence around them? 
 
Arias and Rodrigues (2006: 67) analyzed this dilemma in the favelas 
of Brazil, and concluded that one of the ways in which residents could 
guarantee their own safety was by closely relating to the criminals. The 
authors name this phenomenon the Myth of Personal Security, since the 
residents perceive a level of predictability and security under the rule of the 
gangs, despite not having a guarantee of safety. The case of the favelas in 
Brazil is to some extent similar to the situation of the slums in the Northern 
Triangle. The favelas have been constructed as ‘spaces of crime’ and the 
Brazilian state has hardly been present in the matter of providing security 
within them. Moreover, the Brazilian police is known in the favelas for their 
extraordinary use of violence that has caused many extra-judicial killings 
(Arias and Rodrigues, 2006). As a consequence of the Andean cocaine flow 
towards North America and Europe, traffickers have used the favelas as ‘safe 
havens’ for their operations due to the relative absence of the state. Disputes 
over territory and markets between rival gangs and militias have led to high 
levels of violence and repression (Arias and Rodrigues, 2006). 
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These high levels of insecurity have forced individuals to create their 
own spaces of safety. The Brazilian upper and middle class have done this 
through the construction of gated communities, but those living in the favelas 
and who do not have access to that type of security have often relied on the 
support of the gangs to resolve their local problems and impose order. 
Through certain imposed norms of conduct, the traffickers manage crime and 
local disputes, and apply justice when needed. They punish criminals who act 
outside of these forced norms, and in some sense become a replacement of 
the absent government. This results in a perceived sense of predictability by 
the residents of the favelas that allows the gangs and traffickers to continue 
operating in these spaces. However, when a trafficker breaks the established 
norms, the myth disappears and the violent reality is revealed (Arias and 
Rodrigues, 2006).The persistence of violent non-state actors because of the 
Myth of Personal Security may also be understood, for example, in the 
context of terrorist groups. For instance, in Afghanistan it could be argued 
that the Taliban managed to persist despite the violence and harsh measures 
they carried out because residents did not feel secure with the on-going 
violence since the occupation of the Soviet Union and later the intervention 
of American forces (Jones, 2008). 
 
Bringing the analysis back to the case study of the paper, this 
perceived sense of security by certain individuals might explain the 
persistence of the Maras. In a general sense, the Maras can be understood as 
protection rackets (Cruz, 2010). In a similar way as Tilly (1985) explained 
how states provide protection, the Maras also use sources of extraction as a 
source of income. These extractions are done through extortions or through 
the called ‘war tax’. By paying these fees, individuals will be ‘untouched’ by 
the violence of the extorting gang, but failure to pay can result in their death 
(Cruz, 2010). Thus, this activity could make individuals perceive this ‘order’ 
as a source of security, however, it evidently does not guarantee their safety. 
The MS-13, nevertheless, has given up extorting households living in their 
controlled neighbourhoods, which has made them be seen as benevolent in 
comparison to other gangs (Dudley and Gagne, 2016). Detailed examples of 
how the gangs impose order can be appreciated in the following field 
researches. 
 
Hume (2007a; 2007b) found that many gang members who joined the 
MS-13 in the slums of San Salvador did so out of a perceived need for 
security. By joining the gang, the young men and their relatives living in the 
same neighborhood would be promised protection against the attacks of rival 
gangs. Moreover, according to surveys and official polls, despite the 
disapproval of the gang activities by the residents of the communities, they 
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tended to consider order as more important than civil rights and liberties. The 
reproduction of violence to impose order becomes, thus, a means of survival. 
 
Douglas Farah (2015) found that in the MS-13 controlled 
neighborhood of Choloma in the outskirts of Honduras’ financial district San 
Pedro Sula, the gang formed an improvised juridical system that dealt with 
crime within the neighborhood, and allowed for the operation of some 
businesses that would normally be extorted in other areas of the city. 
According to Farah, the residents living within this neighborhood, or those 
working in the enterprises, felt considerably safer than in other areas where 
they would be vulnerable to gang harassment. This did not mean, however, 
that the MS-13 had given up its violent behavior, since it still acquired 
territory through the use of force, and impose justice coercively. 
 
This phenomenon is replicated in other neighbourhoods of Honduras, 
for example in Tegucigalpa’s Tela, where the gang is responsible for the 
resolution of domestic conflicts and disputes among neighbors. For instance, 
domestic abuse is not tolerated in the neighborhood, and the gang would 
punish and expel men who commit violence against their wives. In the 
municipality of Comayaguela, also in Tegucigalpa, the MS-13 protects the 
local population from extortion from a rival gang called Los Chirizos by 
attacking the individuals that carry out these extortions (Dudley and Gagne, 
2016). 
These examples suggest that in the face of high levels of violence and 
criminality, and the lack of the provision of security by the states has allowed 
the Maras to be potentially considered as a source of security by some 
individuals, despite continuing to be a cause for insecurity in a general sense 
and in reality, not guaranteeing safety to the people they ‘protect’.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This essay has offered a case-based study about private security by addressing 
the question of why the Maras continue to persist in the Northern Triangle. It 
has been argued against the assumption that violent non-state actors only 
persist in failed states, and it has been claimed that one of the reasons for their 
persistence is because, in an environment where security is a private good, 
some individuals can perceive the Maras as a source of private security, as a 
way to deal with the on-going violence that threatens them. 
 
Taking this into account the essay will end with three implications for 
policy and the study of private security. Firstly, the presence of non-state 
actors does not necessarily mean the failure or the weakening of a state. 
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Armed private actors should be understood as something that exists and 
operates parallel to states. Secondly, security should not be considered as a 
private or a public good judging on who provides it. This case has shown that 
even states, which are generally conceived as providing public security, might 
also provide private security in some instances. Lastly, this case has shown 
the importance of individuals’ perceptions of security, and therefore suggests 
that security strategies, such as Mano Dura, should be reconsidered into a 
more inclusive strategy that does not undermine the security of individuals. 
Also, if security as protection appears to inherently be a private good, then it 
is worth considering more preventive strategies for insecurity and address the 
underlying causes of the threats instead of only containing them. 
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